A logic and proof system is introduced for specifying and proving properties of open distributed systems. Key problems that are addressed include the verification of procees networks with a changing intercounection structure, and where new processes can be continuously spawned. To demonstrate the results in a realistic setting we consider a core fragment of the Erlang programming language. Roughly this amounts to a first-order actor language with data types, buffered asynchronous communication, and dynamic process spawning. Our aim is to verify quite general properties of program, in this fragment The specification logic extends the firstorder /J-calculus with Erlang-specific primitives. For verification we use an approach which combines local model checking with facilities for compositional verification. We give a specification and verification example based on a hilling agent which controls and charges for user access to a given resource.
Introduction
A central feature of open distributed systems as opposed to concurrent systems in general is their reliance on modularity. Open distributed systems must accommodate addition of new components, modification of interconnection structure, and replacement of existing components without affecting overall system behaviour adversely. To this effect it is important that component interfaces are clearly defined, and that systems can be put together relying only on component behaviour along these interfaces. That is, behaviour specification, Permission to make digital/hard copy of all or part of this work lbr personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, the copyright notice, the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given tb~t copying is by permission of ACM, Inc. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a l~e, © 1998 ACM 0-89791-969-6/98/0002 3.50
and hence verification, needs to be parametric on subcomponents. But almost all prevailing approaches to verification of concurrent and distributed systems rely on an assumption that process networks are static, or can safely be approximated as such, as this assumption opens up for the possibility of bounding the space of global system states. Clearly such assumptions square poorly with the dynamic and parametric nature of open distributed systems. Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate an approach to system specification and verification that has the potentiality of addressing.open distributed systems in general. We study the issue in terms of a core fragment of Ericason's Erlang programming language [3] which we call Core Erlang. Core Falang is essentially a first-orde~ actor language (of. [1] ). The language has primitives for local computation: data types, first-order abstraction and pattern matching, and sequential composition. In addition to this Core Erlang has a collection of primitives for component (process) coordination: sending and receiving values between named components by means of ordered message queues, and for dymamically creating new components. Similar to [1] an operational semantics is given in terms of a two-level transition semantics: A transition relation on aggregate processes (or: composed system states) on top of one for local computation.
We use a temporal logic based on a first-order extension of the modal/~-calculus for the specification of component behaviour. In this logic it is possible to describe a wide range of important system properties, ranging from type-like assertions to complex interdependent safety and liveness properties. The development of this logic is actually fairly uncontroversial: To adequately describe component behaviour it is certainly needed to express potentialities of actions across interfaces and the (necessary and contingent) effects of these actions, to express properties of data types, to access component names, and to express properties of messages in transit.
The real challenge is to develop techniques that allow such temporal properties to be verified in a parametric fashion in face of the following basic difficulties:
1. Components can dynamically create other components.
2. Component names can be bound dynamically, thus dynamically changing component intercon-nection structure (similar to the case of the ~r-calculus [6] ).
3. Components are connected through unbounded message queues.
4. Through use of non-tail recursion components can give rise to local state spaces of unbounded size.
5. Basic data types such as natural numbers and lists are also unbounded.
We would expect some sort of uniformity in the answers to these difficulties. For instance techniques for handling dynamic process creation are likely to be adaptable to non-tail recursive constructions quite generally, and similarly message queues is just another unbounded data type.
In [4] an answer to the question of dynamic process creation was suggested, cast in terms of CCS. Instead of closed correctness assertions of the shape S : ¢ (S is a system, ~b its specification), which are the typical objects of state exploration based techniques, the paper considered more general open correctness assertions of the shape P b S : ¢ where P expresses assumptions s : ¢ on components s of S. Thus the behaviour of S is specified parametrically upon the behaviour of its component s. To address verification a sound and weakly complete proof system was presented, consisting of proof r~les to reduce complex proof goals to (hopefully) simpler ones. Most importantly loop detection is applied to accommodate discharging of proof goals that are instances of proof goals already encountered during proof construction.
Our contribution in the present paper is to show how the approach of [4] can be used to address the di~ :ulties enumerated above for a fragment of a real programming language, and to show the utility of our approa~a on a concrete example exhibiting some of those difficulties. Thus many details of the proof system are kept very informal in the present paper, and we concentrate instead on an intuitive explanation of our approach, in particular with respect to the rule of discharge. The proof system captures both model checking-like reasoning (by state exploration) and parametric reasoning, and we motivate the discharge rule by first s~ing how it reduces to well-known termination conditions in local model checking, and then generalising to open correctness assertions.
Example The formal machinery introduced in the paper will be illustrated by means of a running example, which is based on the following scenario: A user wants to access a resource paying for this using a given account. She therefore issues a request to a resource manager which responds by dynamically creating a billing agent to act as an intermediary between the user, the resource, and the users account. We view this scenario as quite typical of many security-critical mobile agent applications. The user is clearly taking a risk by exposing her account to the resource manager and the billing agent. One of these parties might violate the trust put in him eg. by charging for services not provided, or by passing information to third parties that should be kept confidential. Equally the resource manager needs to trust the billing agent (and to some minor extent the user). We show how the system can be represented in Core Erlung, how a few critical properties can be expressed, and outline a proof of the desirable property that the number of transfers from the user account does not exceed the number of requests to use the resource.
Core Erlang
We introduce a core fragment of the Erlang programming language with dynamic networks of proce~es operating on data types such as natural numbers, lists, tuples, or process identifiers (pid's), using asynchronous, first-order call-by-value communication via unbounded ordered queues. Real Erlang has several additional features such as communication guards, exception handling, modules, distribution extensions, and a host of built-in functions.
Processes A Core Erlang system consists of a number of processes computing in parallel, and communicating by means of ordered, unbounded message queues. Each process is named by a unique pid of which we assume an infinite supply. Associated with a process is an Erlang expression currently being evaluated and a queue of incoming messages, the process mailbox. Messages are sent by addressing a data value to a receiving process mailbox, identified using its pid. We use the notation {E,p, Q} for a process with pid p, Erlang expression E, Atoms are used to name functions. Expressions are interpreted relative to an environment of function definitions J(Xl,..,X,) -+ E. Such definitions should be considered sugared versions of definitions f = {X,,{...,X,}} -+E assigning matches to function atoms. Each function atom f is assumed to be defined at most once in this environment.
Intuitive Semantics
The intuitive behaviour of most Erlang constructs, in the context of a pid p and queue Q, should not be too surprising:
• K2 is a data type constructor:
To evaluate f~(E~ .... , E~), E1 to E, are evaluated in left-toright order.
• El, E~ is sequential composition: First E1 is evaluated to a value, and then evaluation proceeds with E2.
• El E2 is application: First E, is evaluated to a function atom f (there are no lambda abstractions in the language), then E2 is evaluated to a value V, and then the function definition of f is looked up and matched to V.
• case E of M is evaluated by first evaluating E to a value V, then matching V using M. If several patterns in M match the first one is chosen. Matching a pattern Pi of M against V can cause unbound variables to become bound in Ei I. In a function definition f = M all free variables are considered unbound.
• spawn(El,E2) is the construct for creating new processes. First E1 is evaluated to a function atom ], then E~ to a value V, a new pid p' is allocated, and a process with that pid is spawned evaluating f V. The value of the spawn expression is p'.
• self evaluates to p (the pid of the current process).
• Ex!E2 is sending: E, is evaluated to a pid p', then E2 to a value V, then V is sent to p', resulting in V as the value of the send expression.
• receive M end inspects the process mailbox Q and retrieves (and removes) the first element in that matches some pattern of M. Once such an element V has been found, evaluation proceeds analogously to case V of M.
Example: 8111ing Agents
The introduction presented a "billing" scen~io for securely accessing private resources. In this section the scenario is made more concrete by giving example Core Erlang functions that implement the proposed resource access scheme.
In the code fragments below Erlang variables are upper-case while atoms are lower-case. Atoms are used to name functions (rm, lookup and billagent), but also for identifying message types (contract, re.a, use and trans ) and message parameters (ok and nok). 
Operational Semantics The intuitive meaning of the
Erlang constructs is easily formalised as a Plotkin-style structured operational semantics. Transitions are labelled by triples "pre,a,post" where pre is a necessary precondition for performing the transition (formulated in the logic introduced in Section 3), a is the action causing the transition and post is the result (in terms of variable bindings etc.) of taking the transition. In case both the precondition and the postcondition are always true they will be omitted. To facilitate the definition of the operational semantics (with regards to process spawning) we introduce the notion of a process configuration (E,p,Q), which has the same semantics as a process {E,p,Q}, except at a few key points. 
<EI!E~,p,0) ~¢~,a, po,~ (~'E2,p,Q')
to allow for expression evaluation in contexts, and
for spawning of new processes (p' fresh requires p' to be a new pid).
In the rules a is a metavariable over transition types, either ~" (corresponding to an internal, spontaneous computation step), output p!V, input p?X, or spawn, spain(f, V, p').
It remains to state the rules governing computation steps for (aggregate) processes. These we state in full: Here we use p!?V as a wildcard among {p!V,p?V}, and foreign(p, S) for the predicate on system states S stating that p is not a pid of a process in S.
The Property Specification Logic
In this section we introduce a specification logic for Core Erlang. The logic is based on a first-order extension of the modal p-calculus, extended with Erlang-specific features. Thus the logic is based on the first-order language of equality, extended with recursive (minimal and maximal) definitions, modalities reflecting the transition capabilities of processes and process configurations, along with a few additional primitives.
Syntax The abstract syntax of formulas is given as follows: Intuitive Semantics To limit space requirements we refrain from giving a formal semantics of formulas and make do instead with an informal one:
Equality, inequality, boolean operators and the quantifiers take their usual meanings. Quantified variables range over ground values and queues.
• atom(P) holds if P is an atom.
local(P) holds if P is the pid of a process in the system state being predicated, and analogously foreign(P) holds ffP is a pid and there is no process with pid P in the predicated system state.
The purposes of term(P1) = P2 and queue(P) = Q are to pick up the values of terms and queues associated with given pid's, term(Pl) = P2 requkes Pl to be the pid of a process which is part of the system state being predicated (alt. is the pid of the predicated process configuration), and the Erlang expression associated with that pid to be identical to P2, Similarly queue(P) = Q holds if the queue associated with P is Q. 
nat(P) ~ (P=O) VBX.(P=X +I A nat(X))
Using this idea all involved data types can be defined quite easily. This in turn can be used to define a DeMorganised negation not. We can define "weak" modalities that are insensitive to the specific number of internal transitions in the following style:
Observe the use of formula parameters, and the use of Preventing Abuse by a Third Party. The payment scheme presented here depends crucially on the noncommunication of private keys. For instance, even if we can prove that a resource manager or billing agent does not make illegal withdrawals nothing stops the resource manager from communicating the user account key to a third party, that can then access the account in non-approved ways.
Thus we need to prove at least that the system communicates neither the user account key nor the agent process identifier. Perhaps the service user also requests that her identity not be known outside of the system. In such a case the return process identifiers may not be communicated either. As an example, the property that the system does not communicate the user account key (unless it is also received by th e system) is captured by notraas(UAcc) given the definition below.
notrans( A ) =~ [ ].otrans(A) ^ VX, Y.[X?Y] (contains(Y, A) V notrans(A)) ^ VX, Y.[X!Y] (not(contains(Y, A)) A notr~ru(A))

Toward Parametric Verification
Consider a correctness assertion of the shape r ~ s : b.
where S is an arbitrary system state, b an arbitrary specification, and r consists of first-order assumptions (like: V, = V2) on value variables V in S and b (a restriction that will be lifted in later sections). We wish to devise an adequate and general set of proof rules that allow us to prove such sequents. A natural starting point for this is the classical sequent calculus with equality.
A general sequent will have the shape F I--S : A where £x is a finite set, interpreted disjunctively, of formulas. Classical sequent calculus provides us with a standard collection of rules, easily adaptable to the sequent format of (2) F,pre,post t-S t : dp r I-pre Proofs built up using the proof rules introduced so far will rarely terminate, as both processes and their specifications are given recursively. We thus need a way of safely discharging an assumption once it is seen to be an instance of a proof goal which has already been encountered during proof construction. We discuss the ideas on the basis of an example.
Example Consider the following Core Erlang function:
stream(N, Out) --} Out!N, stream(N + 1, Out).
which sends the increasing stream N, N + 1, N + 2, ... to the process with pid Out. The specification of the program could be that it can always eventually output a value
spec(Out) d., = always(BX.<<Out!X>>true)
The goal sequent takes the shape
I-{stream(N, OuQ, P, Q}: spec(OuQ
That is, the property spec(Out) will hold of the process started with pid P and any input queue Q. The first step in the proof is to unfold the formula definition.
Then, using the proof rules (by unfolding always and performing some trivial proof steps) goal (3) is easily reduced to the following subgoals: (4) is straightforward and does not require recourse to discharge. However, in subgoals (5) and (6) we have arrived at sequents which axe both instances of a sequent already "reduced", namely (3) . Discharge at these points is indeed sound, for reasons explained below. Consider a proof constructed using the proof rules introduced so far. Suppose an internal node of the proof is labelled F I-S : ¢, and suppose the proof has a leaf which is labelled r' t-S' : 4,' such that S' : 4,' is a substitution instance of S : 4, under a substitution, say, p. That is, we have a scenario like the one in the stream example above, with respect to the goals (3) and (5) . Suppose also that F' I-p(4,) whenever ~b E F. That is, with the leaf node F' I-S' : 4,' we have arrived at a situation which is a special ease of a situation we have already considered. We wish to devise safe conditions for discharging the leaf node r' I-S' : ~b'. Informally it suffices, during proof construction, to tag each formula identifier with a unique label whenever it is looked up by applications of UnfoldR while not yet having been assigned a tag, and to assign another unique tag, say, a colour, to each member of the right-hand formula set A in a manner which is preserved by all applications of proof rules. Then, if substitutions are required to respect colours, we can introduce a notion of formula regenerafion path by t~ae.king, from any given 4, E A, using the colouring information, a member of any subsequent right-hand formula set with the sane colour, until the leaf has been reached. In that situation we know for the set A' that we have tracked a formula ¢ which, up to tagging of formula identifiers, is identical to p(¢). We can now inspect the formula regeneration path to pick the outermost tagged formula identifier which is unfolded along the regeneration path and which occurs, with that same tag, in q,. If, for some such ~b we can find such a formula identifier which is defined using a maximal definition then discharge is permitted, otherwise it is not.
What we have described is a proof system for local model checking in the style of the tableau systems of eg. [8] or [9] , extended to cater for symbolic reasoning on value parameters. A more formal treatment of the proof system can be found in [5] .
Parametdcity The proof rules introduced so far are unfortunately incapable of dealing satisfactorily with the complications discussed in the introduction. Features like dynamic process spawning or non-tail recursion cause state spaces to grow in an essentially unbounded manner which can not in general be captured by the discharge conditions given in the previous section. This applies, for instance, to the resource manager defined in Section 2. Moreover, many proof goals require data type induction, mechanisms for which have not been considered yet. In this section we introduce a generalisation of the model checking-Eke approach of the previous section that permits us to address these issues in a very general way.
Consider again a proof goal F ~-S : ¢. Assume that S contains a recursively defined expression which when executed can spawn off some process E. Then, attempting to build a proof using the rules already introduced, we will eventually encounter a sequent of the shape r e SII ( E , p , e } : ¢ .
Clearly we have no hope of terminating proof construction with only the proof rules introduced so far. The solution we propose is to replace components of the agent being predicated by variables of which sufficiently powerful properties can be assumed, for the entire system to be verifiable. This amounts to a cut, using a rule of the following shape:
FI-S~ :7' F , s : ' /~' s J J S~: 7 Cut
This rule allows us, intuitively, to abstract from computational details of a component process that are irrelevant for the desired property of the system as a whole. Now, to handle (7) we c a n then try to guess properties 7~ and 72 for each of the component processes, and then cut out these components. 
Observe that ff the outermost specification @ is well chosen it will often be possible to choose 7t identical to @ itself. Moving on we would then use another cut to reduce (9) to two further subgoals 
We have thus arrived in a situation where a proof goal involving a composite system (7) has been reduced to proof goals for the components, along with an open correctness assertion (11) which does not depend on the system components, only on their properties.
Proving properties of open correctness assertions, however, is a very different task from the problem of proving closed ones in that eg. the modal rules Diamond and Box do not apply. Moreover, the rule of discharge has to be revised in light of the more general sequent shape, and new sets of proof rules are needed.
Discharge Revisited Observe that in case S can recur. sively spawn new processes, as we assumed, the reduction of (7) to (8) may not have actually achieved anything, as S can just continue to spawn off new processes. The task is to terminate the loop. Assume for simplicity that we could choose 7, = @-In this case (8) and (2) are identical, and we would then hope to be able to discharge (8) for the same reasons as discharge for (5) was seen to be admissible even though the path from (2) up to (8) arises for very different reasons (structural ones, the cut) than the corresponding path for (5) which uses the modal rules introduced above. In fact this hope turns out to be justified.
Since formulas are defined recursively also the subgoal (11) may give rise to a recursive proof structure.
That is, in building a proof of (11) we may arrive at a situation where the goal sequent has the shape F ' , s t : "/~,s~ : ~/~ t-s, 1[ s~ : ¢ ' which is an instance of (11). In this case we will have the possibility of discharging when tb was regenerated because of a maximal formula identifier, but in addition we will have the possibility of discharging when one of the 7~ are regenerated because of a minimal formula identifier.
The difficulty is to devise side conditions that ensure that this intuition remains sound even when loops are nested. This issue is addressed in the paper [5] to which we refer for details. For the examples given here, however, the basic intuition is sufficient and sound, whence we leave aside the wider issue for now.
To illustrate the power of the discharge principles notice how, using the representation of d a t a types of section 3, it is possible to capture data type induction by unfolding minimally defined formula identifiers such as
n a t ( P ) = ( P = O) V S X . ( P = X + 1 ^ n a t ( X ) )
to the left of the turnstile.
Proof Rules for O p e n Correctness Assertions
So far we have not discussed proof rules that handle the existence of left hand hypotheses of the shape s : ~b. W h a t remains, besides the classical sequent calculus rules, are rules to to handle modal operators to the left of the turnstile, and to unfold formula definitions (similar to UnfoldR), We need two monotonicity rules: 
where F' is F extended with the fact that Be is a fresh process identifier. This is a critical proof state, where we must come up with a property of the resource manager, and a property of the billing agent, that are sufficiently strong to prove that their parallel composition satisfies the safe property. In general such a proof step may be very difficult, but here the choice is relatively simple:
¢~: The billing agent satisfies the safe property, i.e., safe(Bp, Bank, UAee, N).
Cb:
The billing agent communicates the user account to no process except the bank.
¢c: The resource manager does not communicate the user account, unless some other process first sends it the account. This property can be formulated as notrarts(UAcc) given the definition of the notrans property at the end of Section 3.
Cd:
The resource manager does not send a message containing an atom use (a usage request to a billing agent).
¢~: The resource manager cannot receive messages sent to the Bank process.
Properties q~, ~bd and q~e can easily be formulated in a manner similar to ~be. Essentially these conditions guarantee that Bank transfers are the result of user requests, rather than incorrectly programmed billing agents or resource managers that exchange information with each other. The result of applying the Cvt rule twice is then the following proof obligations: 
The proof of (3) which can be achieved in a manner similar to the proof of (6).
Conclud;ng Remarks
We have introduced a specification logic and proof system for the verification of programs in a core fragment of Erlang, and illustrated its application on a small, but quite delicate, agent-based example. Our approach is quite general both regarding the kinds of languages and models that can be addressed, and the kinds of assertions that can be formulated 2. In addition our approach permits the treatment of programming language constructs such as dynamic process creation, non-tail recursion and inductive data type definitions in a uniform way, via a powerful rule of discharge.
As the goal of this work is quite ambitious, i.e., to enable verification of open distributed systems implemented using real programming languages, there remains a number of shortcomings in the current work. First of all, we need to investigate the proof system in real applications. For this purpose a prototype proof checking tool has been produced based on the approach presented here, that can handle programs of a moderate size. Some support for automation of proof steps already exists (e.g., for the model checking fragment), but we also need to iden6ify other classes of sequen~s that can be proved algorithmically. Other ongoing work focuses on integrating the operational semantics of Erfang more tightly with the proof systems (along the lines of [7] ), and to improve the handling of process identifier scoping (see [2] for an approach to this in the context of the It-calculus).
